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Abstract
We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of comparative advantage in
international trade on fertility. We build a model in which industries dier in the ex-
tent to which they use female relative to male labor, and countries are characterized
by Ricardian comparative advantage in either female- or male-intensive goods. The
main prediction of the model is that countries with comparative advantage in female-
intensive goods are characterized by lower fertility. This is because female wages, and
therefore the opportunity cost of child-rearing are higher in those countries. We demon-
strate empirically that countries with comparative advantage in industries employing
primarily women exhibit lower fertility. We use a geography-based instrument for trade
patterns to isolate the causal eect of comparative advantage on fertility.
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Attempts to understand population growth and the determinants of fertility date as far
back as Thomas Malthus. Postulating that fertility decisions are potentially inuenced by
prevailing wage rates (Becker, 1960), choice over fertility has been incorporated into growth
models with the objective of understanding the joint behavior of population and economic
development throughout history (see e.g. Barro and Becker 1989; Becker et al. 1990; Kremer
1993; Galor and Weil 1996, 2000; Greenwood and Seshadri 2002; Doepke 2004; Doepke et al.
2007; Jones and Tertilt 2008). The large majority of existing analyses examine individual
countries in a closed-economy setting. However, in an era of ever-increasing integration of
world markets, the role of globalization in determining fertility can no longer be ignored. To
ll this knowledge gap, this paper studies both theoretically and empirically the impact of
comparative advantage in international trade on fertility outcomes.
Our conceptual framework is based on three assumptions. First, goods dier in the
intensity of female labor: some industries employ primarily women, others primarily men.
This assumption is standard in theories of gender and the labor market (Galor and Weil, 1996;
Black and Juhn, 2000; Qian, 2008; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Pitt et al., 2010; Alesina
et al., 2011; Rendall, 2010), and as we show below nds ample empirical support in the
data. In the rest of the paper, we refer to goods that employ primarily (fe)male labor as the
(fe)male-intensive goods. Second, women bear a disproportionate burden of raising children.
That is, a child reduces a woman's labor market supply more than a man's. This assumption
is also well-accepted (Becker, 1981, 1985; Galor and Weil, 2000), and is consistent with a
great deal of empirical evidence (see, e.g., Angrist and Evans, 1998; Guryan et al., 2008).
Finally, dierences in technologies and resource endowments imply that some countries have
a comparative advantage in the female-intensive goods, and others in the male-intensive
goods. Our paper is the rst to both provide empirical evidence that countries indeed dier
in the gender composition of their comparative advantage, and to explore the impact of
comparative advantage in international trade on fertility in a broad sample of countries.
The main theoretical result is that countries with comparative advantage in female-
intensive goods will exhibit lower fertility. The intuition is that, all else equal, women's
wages are higher in countries with a comparative advantage in female-intensive industries.
This increases the opportunity cost of children, thereby lowering fertility. We then provide
empirical evidence for the main prediction of the model using industry-level export data for
61 manufacturing sectors in 145 developed and developing countries over 5 decades. We
use sector-level data on the share of female workers in total employment to classify sectors
as female- and male- intensive. The variation across sectors in the share of female workers
1is substantial: it ranges from 8-9 percent in industries such as heavy machinery to 60-70
percent in some types of textiles and apparel. We then combine this industry-level informa-
tion with data on countries' export shares to construct, for each country and time period, a
measure of its female-labor needs of exports that captures the degree to which a country's
comparative advantage is in female-labor intensive sectors. We use this measure to test the
main prediction of the model: fertility is lower in countries with a comparative advantage in
female-labor intensive sectors. The key aspect of the empirical strategy is how it deals with
the reverse causality problem. After all, it could be that countries where fertility is lower
for other reasons export more in female-intensive sectors. To address this issue, we follow
Do and Levchenko (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and construct an instru-
ment for each country's trade pattern based on geographical characteristics and a gravity-like
specication.
The intuition for the instrumental variables strategy is as follows. Exogenous geographical
characteristics such as bilateral distance or common border have long been known to aect
bilateral trade ows. The inuential insight of Frankel and Romer (1999) is that those
exogenous characteristics and the strong explanatory power of the gravity relationship can
be used to build an instrument for the overall trade openness at the country level. Do
and Levchenko (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)'s point of departure is that
the gravity coecients on the same exogenous geographical characteristics such as distance
also vary across industries { a feature of the data long known in the international trade
literature, and attributable to sectoral characteristics such as the elasticity of substitution
between varieties, the value-to-weight ratio, or the importance of timeliness of delivery.
This variation in industries' sensitivity to the common geographical variables allows us to
construct an instrument for trade patterns rather than the overall trade volumes. The details
for the construction of the instrument are described in Appendix C, and the identication
strategy is justied at length in Do and Levchenko (2007). As an alternative approach, we
supplement the cross-sectional 2SLS evidence with panel estimates that include country and
time xed eects.
Both cross-sectional and panel results support the main empirical prediction of the model:
countries with a higher female intensity of exports exhibit lower fertility. The eect is
robust to the inclusion of a large number of other covariates of fertility, and is economically
signicant. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the distribution of the female-
labor needs of exports lowers fertility by as much as 20 percent, or about 0.36 standard
deviations of fertility across countries.
Our paper contributes to the (still sparse) literature that examines fertility in the context
of international integration. Schultz (1985) shows that the large changes in world agricul-
2tural prices and the gender division of labor in agriculture aected fertility in 19th-century
Sweden. Galor and Mountford (2009) develop a model in which trade opening leads to higher
investments in skills in the initially more developed countries, but to faster population growth
in the initially less developed countries. They then provide empirical evidence that higher
trade volumes are associated with less fertility and more education in the OECD countries,
while the opposite holds for the non-OECD countries. Our theory and empirical results
explore a complementary and distinct economic mechanism. While Galor and Mountford
(2009) do not dierentiate individuals by gender, or industries by gender-intensity, these
distinctions are at the heart of our analysis. In addition, our empirical results reveal the
impact of trade patterns, rather than overall trade volumes, on fertility. Saur e and Zoabi
(2011a,b) study the impact of trade on the female labor share, wage gap, and fertility in a
factor proportions framework featuring complementarity between capital and female labor.
Our main mechanism is based on Ricardian productivity dierences, and does not rely on
a dierential impact of capital accumulation on female and male labor. Rees and Riezman
(2011) argue that when globalization improves work opportunities for women, fertility will
fall. In contrast to Rees and Riezman (2011), our model examines international trade as
opposed to foreign direct investment and links fertility outcomes explicitly to comparative
advantage. In addition, we provide extensive empirical evidence to support our hypothesis.
Finally, our paper also relates to the small but growing literature on the impact of glob-
alization on gender outcomes more broadly (Black and Brainerd, 2004; Oostendorp, 2009;
Aguayo-Tellez et al., 2010; Ural Marchand et al., 2011). These papers typically focus on
gender discrimination outcomes, such as the female-male wage gap, and emphasize dierent
channels linking gender outcomes to globalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two-country
two-sector model of comparative advantage in trade and endogenous fertility. Section 3 lays
out our empirical strategy to test the predictions of the model. Section 4 describes the data,




Consider an economy comprised of two countries indexed by c 2 fX;Y g, and two sectors
indexed by i = fF;Mg. The representative household in c values consumption Cc
F and Cc
M of
the two goods, as well as the number of children Nc it has according to some utility function
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i.e. utility is additively separable in the consumption bundle and the number of children
and v (:) is increasing and concave.1 To guarantee interior solutions, we further assume that
limN!0 v0 (N) = +1:
We adopt the simplest form of the gender division of labor, and assume that production
in sector F only requires female labor and capital, while sector M only requires male labor
and capital. Technology is therefore given by
Y
c






where Li is the amount of female labor (i = F) and male labor (i = M) employed in
production, Ki is the amount of capital employed in sector i, and ficgi2fM;Fg are total factor
productivities in the two sectors in country c. Formally, this is the specic-factors model
of production and trade (Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974), in which female and male labor are
specic to sectors F and M respectively, while K can move between the sectors. Thus, we
take the arguably simplistic view that men supply \brawn-only" labor, while women supply
\brain-only" labor, and men and women are not substitutes for each other in production
within each individual sector. Of course, there is still substitution between male and female
labor in the economy as a whole, since goods F and M are substitutable in consumption.
The key to our results is the assumption that countries dier in their relative productiv-





1  = 1 (1)
in both countries. Since the impact of relative country sizes is not the focus of our analysis,
and the aggregate gender imbalances in the population tend to be small, we set the country
endowments of male and female labor and capital to be  Lc
M =  Lc
F = 1 and  Kc = 1 for




Men supply labor to the goods production sector only, and hence supply it inelastically:
Lc
M = 1. On the other hand, home production requires female labor, and women split
their time between goods production and child-rearing. We assume that spending c units of
female labor in home production allows raising Nc = N (c) children, where N (:) is assumed
1Appendix B analyzes a more general form of preferences over consumption goods and children.
4to be continuously dierentiable and increasing and we normalize N (0) = 0. Thus, female
market labor force participation is Lc
F = 1   c:
All goods and factor markets are competitive. International trade is costless, while capital
and labor cannot move across countries. In country c, capital earns return rc and female and
male workers are paid wages wc
F and wc
M, respectively. Let the price of goods i 2 fM;Fg be





M = 1: (2)




Mgc2fX;Y g and female (formal) labor force participation rates fLc
Fgc2fX;Y g,
such that (i) consumers maximize utility; (ii) rms maximize prots; (iii) all goods and factor
markets clear. In the rest of the section, we will solve for the equilibrium in two steps. We
rst consider the global goods production and consumption allocations for a given female
labor force participation decision Lc
F = 1   c (or, equivalently, fertility decision Nc). We
then endogenize households' decisions over fertility.
2.2 Production and Trade Equilibrium
Suppose that the female labor supply is Lc
F = 1   c; where we recall that c is the amount
of time a woman spends at home raising her children. To characterize the production and
trade equilibrium, we set up (i) the rms' and consumers' rst order conditions, and (ii)
market clearing conditions. It will be convenient to express all the equilibrium outcomes of
the economy (prices and quantities) as functions of fc  1
Kc
M; which is a measure of the size
of the female-labor intensive sector.
Firms' Optimization
In each of the two sectors, rms rent capital and hire labor to maximize prots. In other










The necessary and sucient rst-order conditions with respect to Kc
i yield the following








. Equalizing the returns to capital
across sectors and assuming that labor markets clear pins down relative prices of the two
2Due to the assumption that trade is costless, goods prices are the same in the two countries and thus








: Since the adopted numeraire is the consumption bundle, i.e. (2)









































so that equilibrium wages of women and men are
w
c






















The Cobb-Douglas specication of the consumption bundle implies constant expenditure
shares on the two goods, i.e. pFCc
F = Ec and pMCc
M = (1   )Ec; where expenditure is
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[1   (1   )f
c] = 0: (8)
Since goods prices are the same everywhere, equalizing the right-hand sides of equation















where the notation\ c"denotes\not country c."














c 1   c
1    c:
A value c > 1 indicates that country c has a comparative advantage in the female-labor
intensive good F. The comparative advantage can be decomposed into a technological or
Ricardian component c and an occupational or\factor-proportions"component 1 c
1  c, which
can exacerbate or attenuate technological dierences. We rewrite the two equations (8)

















Equation (10) implicitly denes a downward-sloping\goods market-clearing curve"in the
space (f c;fc) and is just a rearrangement of equation (8), keeping in mind that normal-







(1 ). Since goods produced by the two
countries are perfect substitutes, market clearing implies a negative relationship between the
size fc of the F-sector in country c and its size f c in country  c: On the other hand, the
upward-sloping\factor market-clearing curve"in the space (f c;fc), dened by (11), implies
that F-sectors have to be of comparable size in the two countries (i.e. the larger sector F
gets in country c, the larger it needs to be in country  c as well), otherwise the return to
capital will diverge across the F- and M-sectors in each country. Thus, allocations of capital
7between two sectors in the two countries

fX;fY	
are uniquely determined by the system
of two equations (10) and (11).
In summary, we have the following result:
Proposition 1: Production and Trade Equilibrium Consider the endowment
structure




c2fX;Y g = f1;1;1   cgc2fX;Y g . The unique production and con-
sumption equilibrium is characterized by the vector of prices fpF;pM;rc;wc
F;wc
Mgc2fX;Y g in
(3) to (6), and factor allocations

fX;fY	
that solve (10) and (11).
The proof of Proposition 1 establishes existence of an intersection of the two \factor
market-clearing"and\goods market-clearing"curves, which is therefore unique since the two
curves have opposite slopes. The analysis above is carried out under an exogenously xed
fertility rate or, equivalently, an exogenously xed level of female labor force participation.
We now turn to endogenizing households occupational choices and fertility decisions.
2.3 Occupational Choice and Fertility Decisions
To pin down equilibrium c, we proceed in two steps. First, for a given  c, wc
F and c are
endogenously determined by labor supply and demand. Thus, we must ensure that labor
supply is upward-sloping and the female labor market equilibrium is well dened. Second,
female labor supply decision  c of the other country aects the labor market equilibrium
in c by shifting female labor demand in c. We therefore must nd a xed point in fc; cg
such that the female labor markets are in equilibrium in both countries simultaneously.
Female Labor Supply
Taking  c as given and anticipating the production equilibrium prices and quantities, house-
holds make fertility decisions accordingly. Namely, they take prices as given and choose the
share of female labor spent at home c to maximize their indirect utility:
V
c () = r
c + w
c
F (1   ) + w
c
M + v [N ()]:
When the solution is interior, the rst-order condition for the representative household's








8Lemma 1: Fertility Decision Consider the following assumption: for every  2 [0;1];
N"()v
0 [N ()] + [N
0 ()]
2 v"[N ()]  0: (13)
Then, rst-order condition (12) is sucient if and only if (13) holds.
The left-hand side of (13) is the second derivative of v [N ()], and thus the inequality
amounts to the assumption that v [N ()] is concave. Since v (:) is assumed to be concave,
condition (13) trivially holds if N (:) is also concave, i.e. the production of children exhibits
non-increasing returns. However, while sucient, concavity of N (:) is not necessary. For the
solution to be determined by (12), it is only necessary to assume that the composite function
v [N ()] is concave { a weaker condition. Intuitively, v [N ()] aggregates preference for
and production technology of children. The restriction (13) requires that marginal utility of
having an additional child decreases faster than the reduction { if any { in the marginal cost
of producing this additional child.





F = N0 (c)v0 [N (c)] if c < 1
wc
F  N0 (1)v0 [N (1)] if c = 1
: (14)
Under assumption (13), female formal labor market supply is upward-sloping: a rise in
women's wages increases female market labor supply and hence reduces fertility. In general,
an increase in women's wage will have both income and substitution eects. Higher female
wages represent a higher opportunity cost of having children, and thus the substitution eect
implies that a rise in women's wages increases female market labor supply and hence reduces
fertility. However, higher female wages can also have an income eect: since children are a
normal good, all else equal higher female wages can also lead to more children, and thus lower
formal labor supply. The utility function adopted in the main text, which is linear in income
and additively separable in consumption and fertility, allows us to sidestep the income eect
and thus let the female labor supply curve be driven by the substitution eect. The upward-
sloping female labor supply curve and the associated negative relationship between female
wages and fertility are in line with a large body of both theoretical and empirical literature,
going back to Becker (1965), Willis (1973), and Becker (1981). Appendix B considers a more
general utility function and derives conditions for the income eect to be suciently small
for the female market labor supply curve to be well-dened and upward sloping.
9Female Labor Demand
For a given set of parameters

F X;MX;F Y;MY; c	
; equation (5) denes a downward-














Thus, for a given female labor force supply 1    c in country  c; wc
F decreases with fc
and increases with f c: To sign the slope of the female labor demand curve, we rst establish
the following result:
Lemma 2: Comparative statics If comparative advantage of country c 2 fX;Y g in
the female-labor intensive sector becomes stronger (c increases), then country c has a larger
female-labor intensive sector:
dfc
dc (c) > 0:
Thus, an increase in female labor supply in country c increases c's comparative advantage
in the female-labor intensive good (the factor-proportions eect). This will increase fc; the
size of the F-sector in country c and exert a downward pressure on female wages. By the same
token, country  c0s comparative advantage in the female-labor intensive good is reduced,
decreasing f c; the size of the F-sector in that country, which in turn will put additional
downward pressure on female wages in country c: The female labor demand curve is therefore
downward-sloping.
Proposition 2: Labor force participation in partial equilibrium For a given
level of the other country's female labor force participation (1    c); there exists a unique
c satisfying both (14) and (15).
In the proof of Proposition 2, we establish that the female formal market labor supply
and demand curves either intersect at the corner, i.e. c = 1, or in the interior, in which















Lemma 2 and the labor demand equation (15) imply that the female labor demand curve
in country c shifts down when female labor supply in country  c goes up. Thus c ( c);
the equilibrium female labor force participation rate in country c when that rate in country
10 c is  c, is decreasing; so is  c (c): The following proposition formally establishes that
these two\reaction functions"intersect and therefore denes the complete equilibrium of the
economy.
Proposition 3: Characterization of the Complete Equilibrium Equations (3)
to (6), (11), and (14) dene a vector of prices fpF;pM;rc;wc
F;wc
Mgc2fX;Y g, factor allocations
fKc
Mgc2fX;Y g and female labor force participations f1   cgc2fX;Y g that form the unique
equilibrium of the economy.
Cross-Sectional Comparisons
We now consider (fc;c) and ( ~ fc; ~ c), two equilibrium capital and female labor allocations
of the economy when the Ricardian comparative advantage of country c takes values c and
~ c; respectively. The objective of this section is to compare fertility and the allocation of
capital across sectors in these two parameter congurations.
To evaluate at the eect of changes in comparative advantage on the allocation of labor
and capital, we take the ratio of female wages in the two countries and use (11) to obtain
the following equality:
N0 (c)v0 [N (c)]
















~ f c, or both. In other words, a change in comparative advantage triggers either a change
in fertility choices in either or both countries (c  ~ c and/or  c  ~  c), or a reallocation
of capital across sectors in either or both countries (fc  ~ fc and/or f c  ~ f c). However,
since c = 1= c, a stronger comparative advantage in the F-good in country c is associated
with a weaker comparative advantage in country  c, vice and versa. Therefore, if a change
in comparative advantage positively (resp. negatively) aects fertility in country c, it will
simultaneously negatively (resp. positively) aect fertility in country  c: The same holds
for capital allocation. Thus, we can state the following:





c  ~ 
c and 






c  ~ f
c and f




Finally, to see that both labor and capital respond to an exogenous change in comparative
advantage, we note that the right-hand side of (16) is increasing in fc, while the left-hand
11side is decreasing in c: The following equivalence therefore holds:
f
c  ~ f
c () 
c  ~ 
c: (19)
That is, a higher inow of capital in the F-sector is associated with higher female labor force
participation and hence lower fertility in equilibrium.
The last term in (18) is therefore redundant and we can simply write

c  ~ 
c =)

c  ~ c and  c  ~  c

: (20)
The above discussion leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Cross-Sectional Comparison If country c has a Ricardian com-
parative advantage in the female-labor intensive sector ( Fc
Mc > F c
M c), it will exhibit lower
equilibrium fertility: Nc < N c.
Proposition 4 gives the main theoretical prediction of the model, and one that will be
tested empirically: Ricardian comparative advantage gets reinforced by a factor-proportions
component when agents choose fertility and labor force participation rates. The intuition
for this result is as follows. Female wages will be higher in the country with the comparative
advantage in the female-intensive sector, both because of higher relative productivity and
because capital will ow to the comparative advantage sector. Since a higher female wage
increases the opportunity cost of childbearing in terms of goods consumption, equilibrium
childbearing drops.
The theoretical exposition above makes clear what the measurement and identication
challenges for the empirical work are. First, in order to test for the impact of gender-biased
comparative advantage on fertility, we must develop a measure of comparative advantage
in (fe)male sectors. Fortunately, the model presents us with a way of doing this: observed
trade ows. Countries with a comparative advantage in the female-intensive good will export
that good. Our empirical strategy thus starts by building a measure of the female intensity
of exports based on observed export specialization. Second, the model shows quite clearly
that observed specialization patterns and trade ows are endogenous to fertility: countries
with higher technological comparative advantage in the female sector will accentuate that
comparative advantage with a higher female labor supply and will thus eectively exhibit
relative factor proportions that also favor exports in the female-intensive sectors. Thus, in
order to provide evidence for the causal impact of comparative advantage on fertility, we
must nd an exogenous source of variation in comparative advantage. We describe all parts
12of our empirical strategy and results below.
3 Empirical Strategy
To test for the impact of comparative advantage on fertility, we must rst construct a measure
of the degree of female bias in a country's export pattern. We begin by classifying sectors
according to their female intensity. Let an industry's female-labor intensity FLi be measured
as the share of female workers in the total employment in sector i. We take this measure
as a technologically determined industry characteristic that does not vary across countries.








where i indexes sectors, c countries, and t time periods. In this expression, !X
ict is the share
of sector c exports in country c's total exports to the rest of the world in time period t. Thus,
FLNXct in eect measures the gender composition of exports in country c. This measure is
meant to capture the female bias in each country's comparative advantage. It will be high
if a country exports mostly in sectors with a large female share of employment, and vice
versa.3
Using this variable, we would like to estimate the following equation in the cross-section
of countries:
N
c =  + FLNXc + Zc + "c: (22)
The left-hand side variable Nc is, as in Section 2, the number of births per woman, and Zc
is a vector of controls. The main hypothesis is that the eect of comparative advantage in
female-intensive sectors FLNXc on fertility is negative ( < 0). The potential for reverse
causality is immediate here: higher fertility will reduce women's formal labor force partic-
ipation and therefore could also aect the country's export pattern. To deal with reverse
causality, we implement an instrumentation strategy that follows Do and Levchenko (2007),
and exploits exogenous geographical characteristics of countries, together with how those
exogenous characteristics aect international trade in dierent industries dierentially. The
construction of the instrument is described in detail in Appendix C.
We also exploit the time variation in the variables to estimate a panel specication of the
3The form of this index is based on Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) and Do and Levchenko (2007), who




t =  + FLNXct + Zct + c + t + "ct; (23)
where country and time xed eects are denoted by c and t respectively. The advantage
of the panel specication is that the use of xed eects allows us to control for a wide
range of time-invariant omitted variables that vary at the country level, and identify the
coecient purely from the time variation in comparative advantage and fertility outcomes
within a country over time.
The baseline controls include PPP-adjusted per capita income, overall trade openness,
and, in the case of cross-sectional regressions, regional dummies. (We also check robustness
of the results to a number of additional control variables.) The cross-sectional specications
are estimates on long-run averages for the period 1980-2007. The panel specications are
estimated on non-overlapping 5-year and 10-year averages. As per standard practice, we take
multi-year averages in order to sweep out any variation at the business cycle frequency. The
panel data span 1962 to 2007 in the best of cases, though not all variables for all countries
are available for all time periods.
4 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
The key indicator required for the analysis is the share of female workers in the total em-
ployment in each sector, FLi. This information comes from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics
Database (INDSTAT4 2009), which records the total employment and female employment
in each manufacturing sector for a large number of countries at the 3-digit ISIC Revision 3
classication (61 distinct sectors), starting in the late 1990s. We compute FLi as the mean
share of female workers in total employment in sector i across the countries for which these
data are available and relatively complete. This sample includes 11 countries in each of
the developed and developing sub-samples: Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithua-
nia, Korea, Malta, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom; and Azerbaijan, Chile,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey. Table 1
reports the values of FLi in our sample of sectors. It is clear that there is wide variation in
the share of women in sectoral employment. While the mean is 27 percent, these values range
from the high of 71 percent in Wearing Apparel and 62 percent in Knitted and Crocheted
Fabrics to the low of 8 or 9 percent in Motor Vehicles, Bodies of Motor Vehicles, Building
and Repairing of Ships, and Railway Locomotives.4 The export shares !X
ict are calculated
4One may be concerned that these values are very dierent across countries in general, and across devel-
oped and developing countries in particular. However, it turns out that the rankings of sectors are remarkably
similar across countries. The values of FLi computed on the OECD and non-OECD samples have a corre-
14based on the COMTRADE database, which contains bilateral trade data starting in 1962
in the 4-digit SITC revision 1 and 2 classication. The trade data are aggregated up to the
ISIC Revision 3 classication using a concordance developed by the authors.
Table 2 reports some summary statistics for the female labor needs of exports for the
OECD and non-OECD country groups. We observe that for the OECD, the measure is
relatively stable across decades, with an average of about 0.25. For the non-OECD countries,
the female labor needs of exports is higher, between 0.27 and 0.30, and, if anything, rising
over time. Notably, the dispersion in FNLX among the non-OECD countries is both much
greater than among the OECD, and increasing over time. In the OECD sample, the standard
deviation is stable at 0.03-0.04, whereas in the non-OECD sample it rises monotonically from
0.08 to 0.12 between the 1960s and the 2000s.
Tables 3 reports the countries with the highest and lowest FLNX values. Typically,
countries with the highest values of female content of exports are those that export mostly
textiles and wearing apparel, while countries with the lowest FLNX are natural resource
exporters. Equally important for our empirical strategy are changes over time. Tables 4
reports the countries with the largest positive and negative changes in FLNX between the
1960s and today. We can see that relative to the cross-sectional variation, the time variation
is also considerable.
Data on fertility are sourced from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The
baseline controls { PPP-adjusted per capita income and overall trade openness { come from
the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2002). Table 2 presents the summary statistics
for fertility (number of births per women) in each decade and separately for OECD and
non-OECD countries. There is considerable variation in fertility across countries: while the
median fertility after 1980 is 3.3 births per woman in our sample of countries, the standard
deviation is 1.8, and the 10th-90th percent range spans from 1.4 to 6.3. The table highlights
the pronounced cross-sectional dierences between high- and low-income countries, as well
as the secular reductions in fertility over time in both groups of countries. Our nal dataset
contains country-level variables on up to 145 countries.
lation of 0.89. Pooling all the countries together, the rst principal component explains 77 percent of the
cross-sectoral variation across countries, suggesting that rankings are very similar. We also experimented
with taking alternative averages: medians instead of means across countries; and dropping outlier values of
female shares in individual sectors. The results were very similar. Another concern is that FLi is measured
based on data from the last 10-15 years, whereas our estimation sample goes back several decades. We are
not aware of similar data for earlier periods. Our measure of FLi can be combined with data for earlier
time periods as long as there are no \gender-intensity revesals" over time, that is, the ranking of industries
by female intensity is stable.
155 Empirical Results
5.1 Cross-sectional results
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the cross-sectional specication in equation (22).
Both left-hand side and the right-hand side variables are in natural logs. All of the specica-
tions control for income per capita and overall openness. Column 1 presents the OLS results.
There is a pronounced negative relationship between the female-labor need of exports and
fertility, signicant at the one percent level. By contrast, the coecient on overall trade
openness is zero to the second decimal point and not signicant. As is well known, income
per capita is signicantly negatively correlated with fertility. These three variables absorb a
great deal of variation in fertility across countries: the R2 in this regression is 0.63. Column
2 repeats the OLS exercise but including the regional dummies.5 The R2 increases to 0.86,
but the female labor need of exports remains equally signicant.
Column 3 implements the 2SLS procedure. The bottom panel displays the results of the
rst stage. As expected, the instrument is highly signicant with a t-statistic of 9.4, and the
F-statistic for the excluded instrument of 43 is comfortably within the range that allows us
to conclude that the instrument is strong (Stock and Yogo, 2005). In the second stage, the
main variable of interest, FNLX, is statistically signicant at the one percent level, with a
coecient that is about one-third larger in absolute value than the OLS coecient. Column
4 repeats the 2SLS exercise adding regional dummies. The second-stage coecient of interest
both increases in absolute value and becomes more statistically signicant.
The OLS and 2SLS results described above constitute the main cross-sectional nding
of the paper. Countries that have a comparative advantage in the female-intensive sectors
exhibit lower fertility. The estimates are economically signicant. Taking the coecient in
column 4 as our preferred estimate, a 10 percent change in FNLX leads to a 4.7 percent
lower fertility rate. In absolute terms, this implies that moving from the 25th to the 75th
percentile in the distribution of the female content of exports lowers fertility by as much as
20 percent, or about 0.36 standard deviations of average fertility across countries. Applied
to the median of 3.3 births per woman in this sample of countries, the movement from the
25th to the 75th percentile in FLNX implies a reduction of 0.64 births per woman.
5The regional dummies correspond to the ocial World Bank region denitions: East Asia and Pacic,
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America,
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
165.2 Robustness
We now check the robustness of the cross-sectional result in a number of ways. The rst set
of checks is on how the instrument construction treats zero trade observations. As detailed in
Appendix C, the baseline instrument estimates the standard log-linear gravity specication
that omits zeros in the trade matrix, and predicts trade only for those values in which
observed trade is positive. We address the issue of zeros in two ways. The rst is to predict
trade values for the observations in which actual trade is zero based on the same log-linear
regression. The second is to instead estimate a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model on
the levels of trade values, as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). In this exercise,
the zero trade observations are included in the estimation sample. The results of using those
two alternative instruments are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. It is clear that very
little is changed. The instruments continue to be strong, and the second-stage coecients of
interest are similar in magnitude and signicant at the one percent level. We conclude from
this exercise that the way zeros are treated in the construction of the instrument does not
aect the main results.
Table 6 performs a number of additional checks. All columns report the 2SLS results
controlling for openness, income, and regional dummies. Column 1 drops outliers: the top 5
and bottom 5 countries in the distribution of FNLX. Column 2 drops the OECD countries,
to make sure that our results are not driven simply by the distinction between high-income
countries and everyone else.6 Column 3 drops the Middle East and North Africa region,
and column 4 drops Sub-Saharan Africa. It is clear that the results are fully robust to
dropping outliers and these important country groups. The coecients are similar to the
baseline and the signicance is at one percent throughout. Column 5 controls for female
schooling, to account for the possible relationship between education and fertility. Female
schooling is measured as the average number of years of schooling in the female population
over 25, and is sourced from Barro and Lee (2000). While higher female schooling is indeed
associated with lower fertility, the coecient on FNLX changes little and continues to be
signicant at the one percent level. Column 5 controls for the prevalence of child labor, since
fertility is expected to be higher when children can contribute income to the household.
Child labor is measured as the percentage of population aged 10-14 that is working, and
comes from Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006). While the prevalence of child labor is indeed
positively associated with fertility, the main coecient of interest remains robust. Next,
6OECD countries in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We thus exclude the newer members of the
OECD, such as Korea and Mexico.
17column 7 controls for income inequality, using the Gini coecent from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators. Higher inequality is associated with higher fertility, but once
again the main result is robust. Finally, column 8 controls for the extent of democracy, using
the Polity2 index from the Polity IV database. The extent of democracy is not signicantly
associated with fertility, and FNLX is still signicant at the one percent level.
Finally, one may be concerned about how the female intensity of industries FLi is cal-
culated. The results above use the UNIDO database to construct FLi. The advantage of
this approach is that UNIDO covers a large set of countries, and thus will give a more repre-
sentative picture of the employment of female workers in the world. However, one problem
with using the UNIDO data is that it only contains information on manufacturing. To the
extent that some countries export signicant amounts of agricultural and mining raw ma-
terials, this may introduce measurement error into FNLX. To address this coverage issue,
we construct FLi based on data for a single country { the U.S. { using the Labor Force
Statistics database of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Based on data from the
Current Population Survey, the BLS publishes \Women in the Labor Force: A Databook"
on an annual basis since 2005. It contains information on total employment and the female
share of employment in each industry covered by the Census. The data are available at the
4-digit U.S. Census 2007 classication (262 distinct sectors, including both manufacturing
and non-manufacturing). In order to construct the share of female workers in total sectoral
employment FLi, we take the mean of this value across the years for which the data on
the female share of employment are available (2004-2009). After dropping non-tradeables,
the sector sample includes 78 manufacturing and 15 non-manufacturing sectors. Appendix
Table A1 reports the values of FLi for the top and bottom 5 sectors according to U.S. data.
These sectors are similar to what we nd in our baseline measure: the least female-intensive
sectors tend to be in heavy machinery, while the most female-intensive sectors in textiles and
apparel. Appendix Table A2 presents the basic summary statistics of the U.S.-based FLi
measure, breaking up the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors.
While the U.S.-based alternative FLi measure has the advantage of extending the set
of sectors to agriculture and mining, it has two important drawbacks. First, the data are
compiled based on individual-level surveys rather than rm- or plant-level data, and thus
relies on workers self-reporting their industry of occupation. If the number of individuals in
the survey who report working in a particular sector is small, or if workers make mistakes in
reporting their industry of employment, the data will be measured with error. And second,
the U.S. is only one, very special country, and thus its values of FLi may not be representative
of the average country's experience.7 Both of these considerations will raise the amount of
7For our UNIDO-based measure, averaging the share of female workers across a couple of dozen countries
18measurement error on the right-hand side, leading to attenuation bias in the coecients.
With these caveats in mind, Appendix Tables A3 and A4 replicate the cross-sectional
regression estimates in Tables 5 and 6 but using the U.S.-based FLi indicator instead. Note
that because the U.S.-based FLi are measured in a dierent industrial classication, this
exercise requires concording the international trade data to that classication, rebuilding
FNLX, and then re-running the gravity instrumentation strategy from scratch. We can see
that the results are fully robust to this alternative way of measuring the female intensity of
industries.
5.3 Panel Results
The cross-sectional 2SLS results are informative, and allow us to make the clearest case for
the causal relationship between comparative advantage and fertility. However, because they
do not allow the use of country xed eects, the cross-sectional results may still suer from
omitted variables problems. As an alternative empirical strategy, we estimate the panel
specication (23) on non-overlapping 5-year and 10-year averages from 1962 to 2007. The
gravity-based instrumentation strategy is not feasible in a panel setting with xed eects.
On the other hand, country eects allow us to control for a wide range of unobservable time-
invariant country characteristics, and identify the coecient of interest from the variation in
FNLX and fertility within a country over time.
The results are presented in Table 7. To control for autocorrelation in the error term,
all standard errors are clustered at the country level. Column 1 reports the results for the
pooled specication without any xed eects. The coecient is remarkably similar to the
OLS coecient from column 1 of Table 5. Column 2 adds country xed eects. The co-
ecient on FNLX is nearly unchanged, and signicant at the one percent level. Column
3 adds time eects to control for secular global trends, while column 4 adds female educa-
tional attainment. The results continue to be highly signicant. Columns 5{8 repeat the
exercise taking 10-year averages instead.8 The coecients are very similar in magnitude and
equally signicant. Once again, a concern with these estimates is that in the presence of
non-manufacturing sectors, a country's FNLX may be mismeasured. Appendix Table A5
replicates the panel results of Table 7 using instead the U.S.-based version of FLi that in-
cludes non-manufacturing sectors. The results are equally robust when using this alternative
measure.
helps alleviate both of these problems.
8To be more precise, these are decadal averages for the 1960s, 1970s, and up to 2000s. Since our yearly
data are for 1962-2007, the 1960s and the 2000s are averages over less than 10 years.
196 Conclusion
Fertility is an economic decision, and like all economic decisions has long been considered
an appropriate { and important { subject of analysis by economists. As trade integration
increased in recent decades, there is growing recognition that the impacts of globalization are
being felt well beyond the traditional market outcomes such as average wages, skill premia,
and (un)employment. This paper makes the case that international trade, or more precisely
comparative advantage, matters for this key non-market outcome: the fertility decision.
Our results thus emphasize the heterogeneity of the eects of trade on countries' industrial
structures and gender outcomes. At a more conjectural level, to the extent that comparative
advantage impacts fertility, it may also impact women's human capital investments, occu-
pational choice, and bargaining power within the household. From a policy perspective, our
results suggest that it will be more dicult for countries with technologically-based compar-
ative advantage in male-labor intensive goods to undertake policy measures to reduce the
gender gap, potentially leading to a slower pace of women's empowerment. In an increasingly
integrated global market, the road to female empowerment is paradoxically very specic to
each country's productive structure and exposure to international trade.
Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The \goods market-clearing curve" and \factor market-clearing curve" have opposite slopes.
We therefore need to show that they intersect at least once, since if they do, such intersection
is unique. A necessary and sucient condition for the two curves to intersect is that the
\goods market-clearing curve" be above the \factor market-clearing curve" for low values of
fc and below for larger values of fc.
 As fc gets arbitrarily close to 1, equality (10) implies that the\goods market-clearing"
curve is bounded below by 1
1 , while (11) indicates that the \factor market-clearing"
curve converges to 1 < 1
1 , and therefore lies below the\goods market-clearing"curve.
 On the other hand, when fc grows arbitrarily large, the\goods market-clearing"curve
converges to 1
1 ; while the\factor market-clearing"diverges, and hence lies above the
\goods market-clearing" curve.
Thus, the \goods market-clearing" curve is above the \factor market-clearing" curve in the
neighborhood of 1, while the opposite holds for large values of fc. Continuity of the two
curves implies existence of an intersection.
Proof of Lemma 1
The second order condition is precisely inequality (13).
20Proof of Lemma 2
From equation (10), let's try to characterize the behavior of fc when the patterns of com-
parative advantage  are changing.
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The implicit function theorem indicates that f () is well dened and continuously dier-
entiable around  such that x(f();) = 0; we can now compute the derivative of f with
respect to  :
f
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The second and third terms of the equation are always positive, since f > 1: And by virtue
of (10) and (11), the rst term
(1 )f 1
 1 > 0: We thus have
f
0 () > 0:

Proof of Proposition 2
Having established that the female labor demand curve is downward sloping for every level
of country  c's female labor force participation and that the female labor supply curve is
upward sloping, we have shown uniqueness of an intersection. We now need to show existence
of an intersection.
22 As c goes to zero (i.e. female labor supply goes to 1), the labor supply curve dened
by (12) diverges given that N0 (:) > 0 and limN!0 v0 (N) = +1, by assumption. The
labor demand curve is on the other hand bounded above since it is downward sloping;
it therefore lies below the labor supply curve.
 Let's now let c get arbitrarily close to 1, so that c converges to zero. Equation (11)
implies that fc will converge to 1, so that, by virtue of (10), f c will converge to some
 f c > 1 such that +(
c)
(1 )    f
 c  
1   (1   )  f c
= 0. Thus, the labor demand
curve converges to some positive wage  wc
F: Two cases arise:
{ if N0 (1)v0 [N (1)] <  wc
F, then the labor supply curve is below the labor demand
curve at c ! 1; the labor supply curve is thus above the labor demand curve in
the neighborhood of c = 0; while below in the neighborhood of c = 1: Continuity
of the two curves implies existence of an intersection, and thus existence of a well-
dened female labor market equilibrium.
{ if N0 (1)v0 [N (1)]   wc
F; then the two curves intersect in (1;  wc
F):
The two possibilities are depicted in Figure A1.
Proof of Proposition 3
We need to prove that the two \reaction" functions c ( c) and  c (c) intersect at least
once. We have argued that these two curves are decreasing. Furthermore, we note that the
two curves are continuous. We next investigate the behavior of c () as  gets arbitrarily
close to 0 and 1, respectively.
 Since prices in country c are continuous in  c = 0; and lim!0 v0 [N ()] = +1, c (0)
is well dened and interior: there exists "c > 0, such that c (0) = 1   "c:
 Given that c (:) is decreasing, we have c () 2 [0;1   "c]; a compact set. Suppose
now that  c is set arbitrarily close to 1: Then, (11) implies that f c converges to
1, uniformly with respect to c; (10) in turn implies that fc converges towards some
 fc < 1 such that
   fc  
1   (1   )  fc
+  (c)
(1 ) = 0: Equation (5) indicates
that female wages in country c remain bounded above, so that lim c!1 c ( c) > 0.
Thus, the curve  c (:) cuts c (:) at least once, and \from above," as shown in Figure A2




To show uniqueness, we look at the labor market equilibrium. For an interior solution,
f(fc;c)gc2fX;Y g are implicitly dened by (16). The conditions for the implicit function
theorem hold, so that (16) implies that c can be expressed as a function c (fc) of fc and
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23for c (f) < 1 and
dc(f)
dfc = 0 in the case of a corner solution. Thus, any labor and capital
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: On the one hand, (10) denes a negative unconditional
relationship between f and f c; on the other hand, we rewrite (11) as
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Inequality (A.1) implies that uc (:) is increasing, so that (A.2) denes a positive unconditional
relationship between fc and f c: Thus, the two equilibrium conditions for capital dene two
curves with opposite slope, implying a unique intersection, since existence was established
above. Uniqueness of capital allocation across sectors implies uniqueness of labor force
participation decisions.
Proof of Proposition 4
To move from comparative statics to cross-sectional comparisons, we set ~ c = 1: Equilibrium
conditions (10) and (11) and labor market claring equations (16) are thus symmetric in both
(c; c) and (fc;f c), implying ~ fc = ~ f c = 1
1  and ~ c = ~  c = 0; where 0 satises (16).
Implication (20) becomes for ~ c = 1:

c  1 =) c  0   c:
Finally, since the arguments leading to Proposition 4 assume interior solutions for the fmale
labor market equilibrium in both countries, we now address the cases in which the labor
market equilibrium is at a corner (i.e. c = 1 or  c = 1). Without loss of generality,
suppose that c  1.
 If  c = 1; i.e. the F-sector in country  c disappears, then c < 1 (since c =1 implies
that fc = 1; and (10) does not hold for fc = f c = 1); and the proposition trivially
holds. Indeed, if c0s comparative advantage in the F-sector is large enough, then c will
end up producing all the F-goods in the economy.
 Suppose that instead c = 1 and  c < 1: Female wages are given by
w
c
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and since  c < 1; and N0 (:)v [N (:)] is decreasing, we have N0 ( c)v [N ( c)] >
N0 (1)v [N (1)] so that w
 c





This concludes the proof.
Appendix B General Form of Preferences
Suppose that preferences over consumption and fertility are given by
u(CF;CM;N) = ! (C;N)




M ; ! (:) is increasing and concave in
both arguments, and !CN (:) =
@2!(:)
@C@N > 0: the marginal utility from consumption increases
with the number of children, children being themselves consumers of goods. Since consumer




M , the production and trade
equilibrium holding  xed characterized in Proposition 1 is unchanged. Agents' indirect
utility is now given by


c () = ! [r
c + w
c
F (1   ) + w
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where Cc = rc + wc
F (1   ) + wc
M; Nc = N (c), and !N (:) and !C (:) are partial derivates
of ! (:) with respect to N and C; respectively. Similarly, we will denote !UV (:) =
@2!(:)
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Since ! (:) is increasing and concave in both arguments and !CN (:)  0; a sucient condition
for the second-order condition to hold is identical to condition (13): for every  2 [0;1];
N"()!N [C ();N ()] + [N
0 ()]
2 !NN [C ();N ()]  0; (B.2)
which we will henceforth assume to hold.
Applying the implicit function theorem to rst-order condition (B.1) allows us to deter-
mine the slope of the female labor supply curve. Since (B.2) implies that the second order
condition holds, the slope of the female formal labor supply curve is determined by the sign
25of the derivative of c with respect to wF:
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which can be decomposed into the substitution eect (rst term) and the income eect
(second term), that go in opposite directions. The novelty here relative to the main text is
the income eect, which we now examine in greater detail. The rst term in square brackets
represents the level of complementarity between consumption and fertility: an increase in
female wages will translate into higher consumption levels, making the marginal utility of
an additional child higher. Thus, this eect works against the substitution eect. The
second term captures the decrease in marginal utility of consumption, which also osets the
substitution eect.
Rearranging (B.3) yields the result that the sign of the derivative of the female labor force













. Thus, the female labor supply curve is upward-sloping











where M = sup2[0;1] N0 (). The intuition is that the households' increased willingness to
pay for children as they get wealthier is not undoing the substitution eect. This assumption
is similar to the one made in Galor and Weil (1996).
Appendix C Construction of the Instrument
This Appendix describes the steps necessary to build the instrument for the female content of
exports. The construction of the instrument follows Do and Levchenko (2007), and exploits
exogenous geographic characteristics of countries together with the empirically observed
regularity that trade responds dierentially to the standard gravity forces across sectors.
For each industry i, we estimate the Frankel and Romer (1999) gravity specication, which
relates observed trade ows to exogenous geographic variables:
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10





i bordercdaread + 
13
i bordercdlandlockedcd + icd;
where LogXicd is the log of exports as a share of GDP in industry i, from country c to
country d. The right-hand side consists of the geographical variables. In particular, ldistcd
is the log of distance between the two countries, dened as distance between the major cities
in the two countries, lpopc is the log of population of country c, lareac log of land area,
landlockedcd takes the value of 0, 1, or 2 depending on whether none, one, or both of the
26trading countries are landlocked, and bordercd is the dummy variable for common border.
The right-hand side of the specication is identical to the one Frankel and Romer (1999) use.
We use bilateral trade ows from the COMTRADE database, converted to the 3-digit ISIC
Revision 3 classication. To estimate the gravity equation, the bilateral trade ows Xicd are
averaged over the period 1980-2007. This allows us to smooth out any short-run variation
in trade shares across sectors, and reduce the impact of zero observations.
Having estimated equation (C.1) for each industry, we then obtain the predicted logarithm
of industry i exports to GDP from country c to each of its trading partners indexed by d,
\ LogXicd. In order to construct the predicted overall industry i exports as a share of GDP
from country c, we then take the exponential of the predicted bilateral log of trade, and sum







That is, predicted total trade as a share of GDP for each industry and country is the sum
of the predicted bilateral trade to GDP over all trading partners. This exercise extends and
modies the Frankel and Romer (1999) methodology in two respects. First, and most im-
portantly, it constructs the Frankel and Romer (1999) predicted trade measures by industry.
And second, rather than looking at total trade, it looks solely at exports.
Do and Levchenko (2007) discuss and justify this strategy at length. As mentioned above,
the objective is to predict trade patterns, not trade volumes. How can this procedure yield
dierent predictions for ^ Xic across sectors if all of the geographical characteristics on the
right-hand side of equation (C.1) do not vary by sector? Note that the procedure estimates
an individual gravity equation for each sector. Thus, crucially for this strategy, if the vector
of estimated gravity coecients hi diers across sectors, so will the predicted total exports
^ Xic across sectors i within the same country. Indeed, Do and Levchenko (2007) show that the
variation in these coecients across sectors is substantial, generating variation in predicted
trade patterns across countries.
There is another potentially important issue, namely the zero trade observations. In our
gravity sample, only about two-thirds of the possible exporter-importer pairs record positive
exports, in any sector. At the level of individual industry, on average only a third of possible
country-pairs have strictly positive exports, in spite of the coarse level of aggregation.9 We
follow the Do and Levchenko (2007) procedure, and deal with zero observations in two
ways. First, following the large majority of gravity studies, we take logs of trade values, and
thus the baseline gravity estimation procedure ignores zeros. However, instead of predicting
in-sample, we use the estimated gravity model to predict out-of-sample. Thus, for those
observations that are zero or missing and are not used in the actual estimation, we still predict
trade.10 In the second approach, we instead estimate the gravity regression in levels using
9These two calculations make the common assumption that missing trade observations represent zeros
(see Helpman et al., 2008).
10More precisely, for a given exporter-importer pair, we predict bilateral exports out-of-sample for all 61
sectors as long as there is any bilateral exports for that country pair in at least one of the 61 sectors.
27the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator suggested by (Santos Silva and Tenreyro,
2006). The advantage of this procedure is that it actually includes zero observations in the
estimation, and can predict both zero and non- zero trade values in-sample from the same
estimated equation. Its disadvantage is that it assumes a particular likelihood function, and
is not (yet) a standard way of estimating gravity equations found in the literature. The
main text reports the results of implementing all three approaches. It turns out that all
three deliver very similar results, an indication that the zeros problem is not an important
one for this empirical strategy.
Armed with a working model for predicting exports to GDP in each industry i, it is
straightforward to construct the instrument for the female content of exports, based on
predicted export patterns rather than actual ones. That is, our instrument will be, in a







Here, the predicted share of total exports in industry i in country c, b !X
ic, is constructed from








Note that even though ^ Xic is exports in industry i normalized by a country's GDP, every
sector is normalized by the same GDP, and thus they cancel out when we take the predicted
export share.
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31Table 1: Female Labor Dependence of Sectors
ISIC Code Sector Name Dependence
151 Meat, sh, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats 0.36
152 Dairy products 0.25
153 Grain mill, starch products, and prepared animal feeds 0.20
154 Other food products 0.39
155 Beverages 0.23
160 Tobacco products 0.33
171 Spinning, weaving and nishing of textiles 0.37
172 Other textiles 0.47
173 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 0.62
181 Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 0.71
182 Fur and articles of fur 0.41
191 Leather and leather products 0.43
192 Footwear 0.49
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood 0.16
202 Products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 0.18
210 Paper and paper products 0.23
221 Publishing 0.33
222 Printing and service activities related to printing 0.29
223 Reproduction of recorded media 0.35
231 Coke oven products 0.14
232 Rened petroleum products 0.13
233 Nuclear fuel 0.11
241 Basic chemicals 0.15
242 Other chemical products 0.36
243 Man-made bres 0.22
251 Rubber products 0.23
252 Plastics products 0.27
261 Glass and glass products 0.19
269 Non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 0.16
271 Basic iron and steel 0.10
272 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.13
273 Casting of metals 0.12
281 Structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs, steam generators 0.12
289 Other fabricated metal products 0.19
291 General purpose machinery 0.16
292 Special purpose machinery 0.14
293 Domestic appliances n.e.c. 0.28
32Table 1 (continued): Female Labor Dependence of Sectors
ISIC Code Sector Name Dependence
300 Oce, accounting and computing machinery 0.34
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 0.32
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 0.30
313 Insulated wire and cable 0.32
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 0.26
315 Electric lamps and lighting equipment 0.34
319 Other electrical equipment n.e.c. 0.42
321 Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 0.46
322 TV and radio transmitters; telephony and telegraphy apparatus 0.38
323 TV and radio receivers, sound or video apparatus 0.43
331 Medical appliances and instruments 0.38
332 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 0.45
333 Watches and clocks 0.42
341 Motor vehicles 0.09
342 Bodies for motor vehicles; trailers and semi-trailers 0.08
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 0.21
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.09
352 Railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 0.08
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 0.15
359 Transport equipment n.e.c. 0.21
361 Furniture 0.20
369 Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.38
371 Recycling of metal waste and scrap 0.17




33Table 2: Summary Statistics for Female Labor Need of Exports
OECD NON-OECD
Panel A: Female Labor Need of Exports
Mean St. Dev Countries Mean St. Dev Countries
1960s 0.263 0.043 20 0.275 0.077 102
1970s 0.256 0.044 20 0.274 0.082 103
1980s 0.255 0.047 20 0.284 0.100 103
1990s 0.261 0.042 21 0.302 0.109 123
2000s 0.256 0.032 21 0.293 0.122 128
Panel B: Fertility Rates
Mean St. Dev Countries Mean St. Dev Countries
1960s 2.80 0.460 20 6.15 1.367 102
1970s 2.13 0.457 20 5.75 1.593 103
1980s 1.74 0.261 20 5.13 1.758 103
1990s 1.63 0.248 21 3.99 1.847 123
2000s 1.64 0.254 21 3.38 1.704 128
Table 3: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Countries,
1980-2007.
Highest Female Labor Need of Exports Lowest Female Labor Need of Exports
Lesotho 0.650 Algeria 0.146
Haiti 0.572 Angola 0.144
Bangladesh 0.557 Kazakhstan 0.141
Mauritius 0.528 Venezuela, RB 0.140
Sri Lanka 0.525 Saudi Arabia 0.138
Honduras 0.486 Kuwait 0.138
Cambodia 0.485 Nigeria 0.137
El Salvador 0.471 Gabon 0.137
Nepal 0.465 Iraq 0.135
Dominican Republic 0.461 Libya 0.134
34Table 4: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Changers since
1960s.
Largest Increase in Largest Decrease in
Female Labor Need of Exports Female Labor Need of Exports
Cambodia 0.410 Mozambique -0.097
Honduras 0.311 Rwanda -0.112
Haiti 0.269 Sudan -0.112
Sri Lanka 0.225 Ecuador -0.129
Tunisia 0.211 Congo, Rep. -0.132
Albania 0.210 Chad -0.147
Morocco 0.196 Angola -0.159
El Salvador 0.186 Yemen, Rep. -0.160
Madagascar 0.182 Niger -0.170
Nicaragua 0.169 Timor-Leste -0.281
Note: Change is calculated as the dierence between the average Female Labor Need of
Exports in 2000 and that in 1960.
35Table 5: Cross-Sectional Results, 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable: (Log) Fertility Rate
(Log) Female Labor -0.29*** -0.20*** -0.37*** -0.47*** -0.57*** -0.56***
Need of Exports (0.080) (0.057) (0.128) (0.085) (0.131) (0.137)
(Log) Openness -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.037) (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.39*** -0.26*** -0.40*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Constant 5.48*** 4.17*** 5.81*** 5.23*** 5.61*** 5.57***
(0.296) (0.314) (0.480) (0.362) (0.514) (0.540)
R2 0.630 0.859
First Stage
Dependent Var. (Log) FLNX
(Log) Predicted FLNX 3.23*** 3.04***
(0.342) (0.373)
(Log) Predicted FLNX 2.43***
(out of sample) (0.469)
(Log) Predicted FLNX 1.00***
(Poisson) (0.201)
F-test 43.02 34.69 32.21 27.24
First Stage R2 0.400 0.534 0.402 0.392
Region Dummies no yes no yes yes yes
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** sig-
nicant at 1%. All variables are averages over the period 1980-2007 and in natural logs. Variable
denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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6Table 6: Robustness: Cross-Sectional 2SLS Results, 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: no no no Sub- no Middle East Full Full Full Full
outliers OECD Saharan Africa & North Africa
Dependent Variable: (Log) Fertility Rate
(Log) Female Labor -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.59*** -0.42*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.34*** -0.42***
Need of Exports (0.121) (0.082) (0.161) (0.087) (0.092) (0.096) (0.089) (0.093)
(Log) Openness 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.01
(0.034) (0.037) (0.053) (0.031) (0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.034)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.26*** -0.32*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.26***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
(Log) Female -0.11**
Educational Attainment (0.046)




Polity 2 Indicator 0.00
(0.005)
Constant 5.17*** 5.44*** 5.85*** 5.27*** 4.88*** 4.55*** 4.72*** 4.97***
(0.499) (0.348) (0.713) (0.365) (0.438) (0.449) (0.372) (0.439)
First Stage: Dependent Variable Log FLNX
(Log) Predicted FLNX 2.69*** 3.14*** 2.55*** 2.94*** 2.97*** 2.99*** 3.12*** 3.04***
(0.400) (0.407) (0.398) (0.400) (0.362) (0.457) (0.507) (0.427)
F-test 32.81 30.62 32.84 35.59 31.74 29.45 20.98 35.05
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First Stage R2 0.439 0.547 0.542 0.497 0.558 0.513 0.527 0.548
Observations 135 125 104 129 125 103 102 144
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. All variables are averages
over the period 1980-2007 and in natural logs. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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7Table 7: Panel Results, 1962-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Five-Year Averages Ten-Year Averages
Dependent Variable: (Log) Fertility Rate
(Log) Female Labor -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.24*** -0.23***
Need of Exports (0.067) (0.077) (0.058) (0.061) (0.069) (0.093) (0.069) (0.072)
(Log) Openness -0.02 -0.18*** -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.18*** -0.02 -0.00
(0.028) (0.041) (0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.049) (0.036) (0.039)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.20*** -0.19***
(0.019) (0.051) (0.043) (0.047) (0.019) (0.059) (0.048) (0.051)
(Log) Female -0.00 -0.01
Educational Attainment (0.038) (0.041)
Country FE no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Year FE no no yes yes no no yes yes
R2 0.576 0.885 0.937 0.936 0.584 0.895 0.943 0.942
Observations 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,102 627 627 627 554
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
All of the variables are 5-year averages (left panel) or 10-year averages (right panel) over the time periods spanning 1962-2007, and in
natural logs. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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8Appendix Table A1: Least and Most Female-Intensive Sectors, U.S. Data
Least Female-Intensive FLi Most Female-Intensive FLi
Logging 5.4 Other apparel and
accessories
56.3
Coal Mining 5.7 Leather tanning and
nishing
56.3
Cement, concrete, lime, and
gypsum
10.3 Retail bakeries 58
Sawmills and wood
preservation
11.3 Specialized design services 58
Nonmetallic mineral mining
and quarrying
11.5 Cut and sew apparel 66.1
Appendix Table A2: Summary Statistics, U.S.-based measure of FL
Mean Min Max SD N
Manufacturing 29.7 10.3 66.1 13.6 78
Non-manufacturing 25.8 5.4 58 15.6 15
39Appendix Table A3: Cross-Sectional Results, U.S.-Based Measure of FLi, 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable: (Log) Fertility Rate
(Log) Female Labor -0.45*** -0.34*** -0.80*** -0.65*** -0.70*** -0.63***
Need of Exports (0.111) (0.080) (0.199) (0.120) (0.164) (0.145)
(Log) Openness -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.037) (0.031) (0.041) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.37*** -0.25*** -0.37*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 5.82*** 4.56*** 6.96*** 5.57*** 5.75*** 5.50***
(0.340) (0.327) (0.616) (0.396) (0.528) (0.476)
R2 0.644 0.865
First Stage
Dependent Var. (Log) FLNX
(Log) Predicted FLNX 1.77*** 1.61***
(0.236) (0.246)
(Log) Predicted FLNX 1.15***
(out of sample) (0.250)
(Log) Predicted FLNX .984***
(Poisson) (0.179)
F-test 19.37 15.28 9.52 11.32
First Stage R2 0.346 0.451 0.334 0.386
Region Dummies no yes no yes yes yes
Observations 149 149 145 145 145 145
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. All variables are averages over the
period 1980-2007 and in natural logs. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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0Appendix Table A3: Robustness: Cross-Sectional 2SLS Results, U.S.-Based Measure of FLi, 1980-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: no no no Sub- no Middle East Full Full Full Full
outliers OECD Saharan Africa & North Africa
Dependent Variable: (Log) Fertility Rate
(Log) Female Labor -0.84*** -0.70*** -0.80*** -0.52*** -0.56*** -0.51*** -0.35*** -0.60***
Need of Exports (0.206) (0.132) (0.170) (0.109) (0.110) (0.101) (0.102) (0.124)
(Log) Openness 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.01
(0.033) (0.036) (0.048) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.032)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.23*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.23***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.023) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025)
(Log) Female -0.09**
Educational Attainment (0.043)




Polity 2 Indicator -0.00
(0.005)
Constant 6.07*** 5.91*** 6.42*** 5.34*** 5.24*** 4.89*** 4.63*** 5.30***
(0.682) (0.421) (0.636) (0.364) (0.437) (0.445) (0.411) (0.441)
First Stage: Dependent Variable Log FLNX
(Log) Predicted FLNX 1.13*** 1.69*** 1.58*** 1.61*** 1.63*** 1.69*** 1.77*** 1.58***
(0.197) (0.294) (0.261) (0.275) (0.240) (0.284) (0.315) (0.261)
F-test 9.97 16.24 13.93 14.57 16.71 16.94 13.86 14.91
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First Stage R2 0.359 0.454 0.487 0.450 0.497 0.552 0.516 0.455
Observations 135 125 104 129 125 103 102 144
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. All variables are averages over the
period 1980-2007 and in natural logs. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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1Appendix Table A5: Panel Results, U.S.-Based Measure of FLi, 1962-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Five-Year Averages Ten-Year Averages
Dependent Variable: (Log) Fertility Rate
(Log) Female Labor -0.61*** -0.55*** -0.23*** -0.19** -0.62*** -0.61*** -0.27** -0.22**
Need of Exports (0.092) (0.103) (0.086) (0.092) (0.096) (0.122) (0.102) (0.109)
(Log) Openness -0.01 -0.15*** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.15*** -0.01 0.00
(0.028) (0.040) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.047) (0.035) (0.038)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.021) (0.048) (0.042) (0.045) (0.021) (0.055) (0.046) (0.049)
(Log) Female 0.01 0.00
Educational Attainment (0.040) (0.043)
Country FE no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Year FE no no yes yes no no yes yes
R2 0.594 0.889 0.936 0.934 0.602 0.899 0.942 0.940
Observations 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,102 627 627 627 554
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. All of the
variables are 5-year averages (left panel) or 10-year averages (right panel) over the time periods spanning 1962-2007, and in natural logs. Variable
denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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2Figure A1. Female Formal Labor Market Equilibrium
wF 





Interior solution  Corner solution 






Figure A2. Equilibrium Female Labor Force Participation
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